David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 4 (3):368-381 (2007)
I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the proposition. The account explains the intuitive appeal of the basic principle associated with the transmission view of testimony: the principle according to which, a listener can normally obtain testimonial knowledge that p by believing a speaker who testifies that p only if the speaker knows that p. It also explains a common response to counterexamples to this principle: that these counterexamples do not involve normal cases of testimonial knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1979). What is It to Believe Someone? In C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief. University of Notre Dame Press.
Robert Audi (1997). The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):405 - 422.
Sanford Goldberg (2005). Testimonial Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony. Analysis 65 (288):302–311.
Peter J. Graham (2000). Conveying Information. Synthese 123 (3):365-392.
Citations of this work BETA
Alex Stein (2008). On the Epistemic Authority of Courts. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 402-410.
Axel Gelfert (2013). Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief. Philosophia 41 (3):763-786.
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