On the de-naturalization of epistemology

Abstract
Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yields a sceptical paradox. This means that Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a rather strong argument for scepticism and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that this paradox can be solved by an approach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution proposed has to leave open.
Keywords hermeneutics  heuristics  naturalized epistemology  normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1022463521120
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,491
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sander Verhaegh (2014). Quine's Argument From Despair. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
Wang Huaping & Sheng Xiaoming (2007). Cooperative Naturalism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):601-613.
Huaping Wang & Xiaoming Sheng (2007). Cooperative Naturalism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):601 - 613.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

24 ( #158,602 of 1,902,069 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #466,345 of 1,902,069 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.