Führt die evolutionäre erkenntnistheorie in einen relativismus?

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology
Keywords Evolutionary Epistemology  Genetic Epistemology  cognition (human knowledge)  theories of truth  explanation of validity claims by genetic means  adaptation  unity of selection  reality  constructivism  relativism
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Paul K. Moser (1986). On Scientific Justification by Consensus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (1):154-161.
Thomas Kesselring (1992). Führt die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie in einen Relativismus? Kritische Erörterungen zu: Eve-Marie Engels: 'Erkenntnis als Anpassung?'. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 23 (2):265 - 288.

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