Graduate studies at Western
Theoria 78 (2):128-145 (2012)
|Abstract||W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, and how Quine's conception of objects should be understood if he is also to be regarded as a realist. I also address the question whether Quine should be placed on the realist or the anti-realist side of the current realism debate. I argue that Quine's conception of objects as posits is a general account of the nature of objects, and that this account does not conflict with Quine's realism as long as this realism is properly understood. I also argue that Quine cannot be placed on either side of the contemporary realism debate, since his realism is not metaphysical realism and his conception of objects is not an anti-realist doctrine according to which objects would be less than real|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gregg Caruso (2007). Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism: A Closer Look at the Views of Quine and Devitt. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 21:64-83.
Otávio Bueno (2003). Quine's Double Standard: Undermining the Indispensability Argument Via the Indeterminacy of Reference. Principia 7 (1-2):17-39.
Josh Parsons (2005). Truthmakers, the Past, and the Future. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.
Władysław Krajewski (1992). Questions of the Objects of Knowledge and Types of Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (3):205-213.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. rodopi.
Ron Wilburn (1992). Semantic Indeterminacy and the Realist Stance. Erkenntnis 37 (3):281 - 308.
Ioannis Votsis, The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Jan Dejnožka (2006). Observational Ecumenism, Holist Sectarianism. Philo 9 (2):165-191.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
Malcolm Budd (2005). Aesthetic Realism and Emotional Qualities of Music. British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2):111-122.
By Crawford L. Elder (2006). Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1–15.
Added to index2012-03-01
Total downloads24 ( #57,962 of 740,542 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,533 of 740,542 )
How can I increase my downloads?