David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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It has been difficult to define human consciousness because of its many differing qualities and because of various views people have of consciousness. It is proposed that these multiple vantage points be united into a single three-dimensional model utilizing breadth, time and depth. This model could provide a more comprehensive definition of consciousness and encourage an exploration of the interplay of consciousness’ many features. Such a model may also help answer some of the many questions that the concept of consciousness creates.
|Keywords||consciousness mind-body problem the " hard" problem subconsciousness|
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