David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300 (2004)
Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of Russell's structuralism, that this move fails to achieve an interesting intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. Rather, () adds little content beyond the instrumentalistically acceptable claim that the theory is empirically adequate. Here, I formulate carefully the crucial claim of Demopoulos and Friedman, and show that the Ramsey sentence () is true just in case possesses a full model which is empirically correct and satisfies a certain cardinality condition on its theoretical domain. This suggests that structural realism is not a position significantly different from the anti-realism it attempts to distinguish itself from. Introduction Technical framework Ramsification Empirical adequacy Ramsification empirical adequacy + cardinality constraint Conclusion.
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Anjan Chakravatty (2010). Informational Versus Functional Theories of Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):197 - 213.
Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
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