Validity as a primitive

Analysis 72 (3):421-430 (2012)
Abstract
A number of recent works consider treating validity as a primitive notion rather than one defined in some standard manner. There seem to have been three motivations. First, to understand how truth and validity interact in potentially paradoxical settings. Second, to argue that validity is in fact afflicted with paradoxes analogous to the semantic paradoxes. Third, to develop a ‘deflationary’ conception of validity or consequence. This article treats the notion of validity as a primitive notion and shows how to provide a consistent theory of classical validity (and self-applicative truth), conservative over Peano arithmetic
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Citations of this work BETA
Lionel Shapiro (2013). Validity Curry Strengthened. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):100-107.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Gauker (1990). Semantics Without Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31 (3):437-461.
Andrea Iacona (2010). Validity and Interpretation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):247-264.
Joseph Heath (1998). What is a Validity Claim? Philosophy and Social Criticism 24 (4):23-41.
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