David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 40 (4):538-546 (1973)
Meehl's statement "in most psychological research, Improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching 1/2 of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction" (philosophy of science, Volume 34, Pages 103-115), Is without foundation. The computation of prior probabilities of accepting or rejecting a hypothesis presupposes knowledge of the prior probabilities that this hypothesis or any of its conceivable alternatives are true. As we do not have such knowledge, We cannot give any numerical values of prior probabilities of accepting or rejecting hypotheses in any statistical test procedure. Only topological statements are possible, As for example: when the region of acceptance of a hypothesis narrows, The prior probability that it will be accepted remains constant or increases
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John C. Harsanyi (1983). Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses. Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
Patrick Suppes (2007). Where Do Bayesian Priors Come From? Synthese 156 (3):441 - 471.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary - Part I: The Indifference Approach. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1116-1126.
Max Albert (1992). Die Falsifikation Statistischer Hypothesen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (1):1 - 32.
Joel D. Velasco (2008). The Prior Probabilities of Phylogenetic Trees. Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):455-473.
Hugues Leblanc (1962/2006). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.
Wesley C. Salmon (1965). The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 32 (2):137-146.
Festa, Roberto, Optimum Inductive Methods. A Study in Inductive Probability, Bayesian Statistics, and Verisimilitude.
Joseph F. Hanna (1984). On the Empirical Adequacy of Composite Statistical Hypotheses. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:73 - 80.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #323,188 of 1,413,175 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #153,719 of 1,413,175 )
How can I increase my downloads?