David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 43 (3):311-336 (1976)
Science progresses if we succeed in rendering the objects of scientific inquiry more comprehensively or more precisely. Popper tries to formalize this venerable idea. According to him the most comprehensive and most precise description of the world is given by the set T of all true statements. A hypothesis comes the closer to T, or has the more verisimilitude, the more true consequences and the fewer false consequences it implies. Popper proposes to order hypotheses by the inclusion relations between the sets of their true and of their false consequences ("truth contents" and "falsity contents"). A partial ordering would permit one to decide whether the substitution of theory t 1 by t 2 represents scientific progress. But because of the logical relations between the elements of the sets of logical consequences, or contents, false hypotheses cannot be compared. As our theories usually turn out to be false sooner or later, they can seldom be compared as to their verisimilitude and when they can, the result depends only on which theory implies the other and on their truth-values. Popper even tries to define a measure of verisimilitude on the partial ordering. It has to fail for the same reason. In addition he tries to relativize the concept of a content and fails. What is more, any attempt at defining a measure of better or worse correspondence to the whole truth must fail, as there is no justification for saying that any true primitive sentence asserts as much about reality as some other primitive sentence, or more
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Herbert Keuth (1978). Methodologische Regeln Des Kritischen Rationalismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 9 (2):236-255.
Gérald Lafleur (1989). Vérisimilarité et méthodologie poppérienne. Dialogue 28 (03):365-.
Similar books and articles
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (1992). Truthlikeness Without Truth: A Methodological Approach. Synthese 93 (3):343 - 372.
Jesùs P. Zamora Bonilla (1996). Verisimilitude, Structuralism and Scientific Progress. Erkenntnis 44 (1):25 - 47.
Pavel Tichy (1974). On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):155 - 160.
Jan Woleński (1989). On Comparison of Theories by Their Contents. Studia Logica 48 (4):617 - 622.
Philippe Mongin (1990). A Note on Verisimilitude and Relativization to Problems. Erkenntnis 33 (3):391 - 396.
Giangiacomo Gerla (2007). Point-Free Geometry and Verisimilitude of Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):707 - 733.
Joseph Wayne Smith (1984). What is Wrong with Verisimilitude. Philosophy Research Archives 10:511-541.
Gustavo Cevolani (2011). Strongly Semantic Information and Verisimilitude. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics (2):159-179.
Ken Gemes (2007). Verisimilitude and Content. Synthese 154 (2):293 - 306.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #94,978 of 1,102,451 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #298,715 of 1,102,451 )
How can I increase my downloads?