Sensory consciousness explained in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do
Keywords qualia  consciousness  sensorimotor  skill  sensation  action
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.

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