A Dilemma for Personal Identity

Abstract
Some theories of personal identity allow persons to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Deborah C. Smith (2001). Parfit on Personal Identity. Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.
    R. G. Swinburne (1973). Personal Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
    Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Igor Douven (1999). Marc Slors on Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-11-17

    Total downloads

    11 ( #112,987 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.