Online research in philosophy

Al-Farabi and His School examines one of the most exciting and dynamic periods in the development of medieval Islam: the period which ran from the late ninth century to the early eleventh century AD. This age is examined through the thought of five of its principal thinkers and named after the first and greatest of these as the "Age of Farabism." Ian Richard Netton demonstrates that the great Islamic philosopher al-Farabi (870-950), called "the Second Master" after Aristotle, produced a recognizable school of thought. This school of thought, which Netton refers to as the "School of al-Farabi," was influenced by the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Yet, it was much more than a mere clone of Greek thought. The originality and independence of thought expressed by such adherents as Yahya b. Adi, Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani, al-Amiri and Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi is described, appreciated, and critically assessed in this volume, with an emphasis given to the fundamentals of epistemology. Al-Farabi and His School is unique in its examination of the intellectual continuity that was maintained in an age of flux, and its particular emphasis on the ethical dimensions of knowledge.

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato''s account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato''s assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato''s criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person''s way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.

v. 1. Arabic text -- v. 2. English translation.

This dissertation offers a new and comprehensive analysis of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's (d. 950) cosmology by focusing on various important issues that have been largely neglected by the modern scholarship. It provides an examination of the physical, metaphysical, and astronomical aspects of al-Fārābī's cosmology by adopting a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account the history of philosophy and the history of astronomy. Accordingly, my dissertation explores how al-Fārābī attempted to reconcile features of Ptolemaic astronomy with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories, an endeavor which resulted in the formulation of innovative cosmological ideas. Chapters I and II provide background information on al-Fārābī's activity as a commentator and his relation to the Greek commentatorial tradition and assess the relevant primary sources. In addition, they examine al-Fārābī's approach to cosmology and his scientific method in terms of both the Ptolemaic astronomical tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Chapter III addresses problems related to the structure of al-Fārābī's cosmology, especially the origin of his ennadic cosmological model and his spherology. Particular attention is devoted to the question of how Aristotle's unmoved movers and Ptolemy's astronomical theories are reconciled. Chapters IV, V, and VI analyze the place of celestial matter, intellect, and motion respectively in al-Fārābī's cosmology and attempt to redefine the second teacher's relation to the various trends of Greek philosophy. The study stresses al-Fārābī's connection with the Neoplatonic and Peripatetic currents, particularly with thinkers such as Alexander of Aphrod.

I evaluate the claim that modern urban regions are desirable sites for inclusive forms of democratic governance. Although certain features of city life do hold such promise, I argue that these same features coincide with exclusionary attitudes and activities that undermine democratic hopes. I then clarify the necessary conditions for more inclusive urban democracy, distinguishing my account from prominent criticisms of suburban culture and urban sprawl advanced by, among others, advocates of the new urbanism. I conclude with proposals for reform that emphasize creative uses of existing and emerging technologies and institutions, and a more democratic conception of eminent domain authority. Key Words: democracy • difference • cities • citizenship • eminent domain • new urbanism.

Happiness (sa'a>dah) materializes as the ultimate goal of man in Abu> Nas}r Muh{ammad b. Muh{ammad b. T{arkha>n al- Fa>ra>bi>'s Maba>di' A' Ahl Al-Madi>na Al-Fa>d}ila (Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State). But happiness, i.e., happiness in this life and happiness in the afterlife, is only attainable by the virtuous citizen. The prevailing academic vision of Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City essentially can be placed into two categories: either it is an ideal as found in Plato's Republic or it is an actual city that has been founded or will be established at some time in the future. The difficulty with both of these interpretations is that they limit who can attain happiness. I will argue that we must examine Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City in a different light. I will show that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is comparable to the Plotinian World Soul in which it is the genus of all souls and it is the place to which all souls strive to return, and there attain happiness. As a result, it can be argued that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is a city that exists in the intelligible world; it contains both citizens that reside within the city and citizens that reside in the material world. Through a comparison of Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City with the Plotinian World Soul, we shall see that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is not unlike Aurelius Augustine's City of God, which is also a city that exists in the intelligible world, and has citizens within both this city and here on earth. By comparing the relevant texts of Plotinus, Augustine, and Fa>ra>bi>, it becomes possible to illustrate how Fa>ra>bi>, like Augustine, utilized the Plotinian Triple Hypostases (The One, Nous, and the World Soul) in order to answer the ultimate questions: Why does man desire happiness? How does man attain this happiness? And most importantly, where can man attain this happiness?