David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105 (2010)
The underconsideration argument against inference to the best explanation and scientific realism holds that scientists are not warranted in inferring that the best theory is true, because scientists only ever conceive of a small handful of theories at one time, and as a result, they may not have considered a true theory. However, antirealists have not developed a detailed alternative account of why explanatory inference nevertheless appears so central to scientific practice. In this paper, I provide new defences against some recent objections to the underconsideration argument, while also developing an account of explanatory inference that both survives these criticisms and does not entail realism
|Keywords||explanation inference scientific realism internalism externalism|
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Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Martin Carrier (1991). What is Wrong with the Miracle Argument??☆. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (1):23-36.
Timothy Day & Harold Kincaid (1994). Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place. Synthese 98 (2):271-295.
Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
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