Default privilege and bad lots: Underconsideration and explanatory inference

Abstract
The underconsideration argument against inference to the best explanation and scientific realism holds that scientists are not warranted in inferring that the best theory is true, because scientists only ever conceive of a small handful of theories at one time, and as a result, they may not have considered a true theory. However, antirealists have not developed a detailed alternative account of why explanatory inference nevertheless appears so central to scientific practice. In this paper, I provide new defences against some recent objections to the underconsideration argument, while also developing an account of explanatory inference that both survives these criticisms and does not entail realism
Keywords explanation  inference  scientific realism  internalism  externalism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Martin Carrier (1991). What is Wrong with the Miracle Argument??☆. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (1):23-36.

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