David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 22 (1):92-115 (2007)
This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the input can be compared to the output and shown to be relatively impoverished. I argue that there are robust methods of comparing input to output without measuring them quantitatively.
|Keywords||HIPPOCAMPAL VOLUME DISPOSITIONS BIRDSONG POVERTY NURTURE|
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Mumford (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
Fiona Cowie (1999). What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered. Oxford University Press.
Timothy D. Johnston (1988). Developmental Explanation and the Ontogeny of Birdsong: Nature/Nurture Redux. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (4):617.
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
Paul Griffiths, Edouard Machery & Stefan Linquist (2009). The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. Mind and Language 24 (5):605-630.
Elizabeth O’Neill (2015). Relativizing Innateness: Innateness as the Insensitivity of the Appearance of a Trait with Respect to Specified Environmental Variation. Biology and Philosophy 30 (2):211-225.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2013). In Defense of Nativism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):693-718.
Brian McLoone & Rory Smead (2014). The Ontogeny and Evolution of Human Collaboration. Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):559-576.
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