David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Epistemology 24 (1):45 – 61 (2010)
In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific axiologies of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values
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References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Ian Hacking (1999). The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Acreman (2014). Show Us Your Traces: Traceability as a Measure for the Political Acceptability of Truth-Claims. Contemporary Political Theory 1 (1):01-01.
Stephen Acreman (2015). Show Us Your Traces: Traceability as a Measure for the Political Acceptability of Truth-Claims. Contemporary Political Theory 14 (3):197-212.
James Hikins & Richard Cherwitz (2011). On the Ontological and Epistemological Dimensions of Expertise: Why “Reality” and “Truth” Matter and How We Might Find Them. Social Epistemology 25 (3):291 - 308.
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