Should we eliminate the innate? Reply to Griffiths and Machery
Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):505 – 519 (2009)
| Abstract | Griffiths and Machery (2008) have argued that innateness is a folk notion that obstructs inquiry and has no place in contemporary science. They support their view by criticizing the canalization account of innateness (Ariew, 1999, 2006). In response, I argue that the criticisms they raise for the canalization account can be avoided by another recent account of innateness, the triggering account, which provides an analysis of the concept as it applies to cognitive capacities (Khalidi, 2002, 2007; Stich, 1975). I also claim that they have not demonstrated that the folk notion of innateness is unsuitable for rehabilitation in a science of cognition. I conclude that they have not made the case that the notion of innateness ought to be eliminated from a scientific account of the mind | |||||||||
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Andre Ariew (1999). Innateness is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness. In Andre Ariew (ed.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
David Wendler (1996). Innateness as an Explanatory Concept. Biology and Philosophy 11 (1):89-116.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2001). Innateness and Domain-Specificity. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
John Collins (2011). Innateness, Canalization, and the Modality-Independence of Language: A Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2007). Innate Cognitive Capacities. Mind and Language 22 (1):92-115.
Paul E. Griffiths & Edouard Machery (2008). Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicizing the Mind'. Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):397 – 414.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2002). Nature and Nurture in Cognition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):251-272.
John M. Collins (2005). Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):157-177.
Jonathan Birch (2009). Irretrievably Confused? Innateness in Explanatory Context. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 40 (4):296-301.
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