David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 10 (4):402-22 (1995)
Two main theories of concepts have emerged in the recent psychological literature: the Prototype Theory (which considers concepts to be self-contained lists of features) and the Theory Theory (which conceives of them as being embedded within larger theoretical networks). Experiments supporting the first theory usually differ substantially from those supporting the second, which suggests that these the· ories may be operating at different levels of explanation and dealing with different entities. A convergence is proposed between the Theory Theory and the intentional stance in the philosophy of language and mind. From this stance, concepts should not be thought of as concrete physical entities
|Keywords||Intentionality Philosophy Psychology Science|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Edward E. Smith & L. Douglas (1981). Categories and Concepts. Harvard University Press.
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