David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Thought 1 (1):71-78 (2012)
One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson to this conclusion that will show that it is false that subjectivism could explain disagreement as well as expressivism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Cognitivism. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
Mark Schroeder (2008). Being For. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
By Ira M. Schnall (2004). Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):587–594.
Matthew Chrisman (2007). From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Richard Joyce (2010). Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.
Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.
James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Christos Kyriacou (2012). Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237.
Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
David Merli (2008). Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):25 - 55.
Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Added to index2012-03-17
Total downloads58 ( #27,298 of 1,102,934 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,918 of 1,102,934 )
How can I increase my downloads?