Why von Neumann Rejected Carnap’s Dualism of Information Concepts

Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 8:97-134 (2001)
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Abstract

In a private discussion in Princeton in 1952, von Neumann argued against Carnap’s view that epistemological concepts like information should be treated separately from physics or from any natural science. For Carnap, such a separation had been taken so much for granted that he was very nonplussed and he consequently withheld from publication — out of apprehension it did not sufficiently clarify important points — a study on information

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