Online research in philosophy

Judicial activism is in serious, though undeserved, trouble. The current impasse over its role in constitutional discourse pits two opposed positions committed to different paradigms of judicial activism against one another. One side condemns activist judges for engaging in ultra vires adjudication by reading their idiosyncratic values into the Constitution. In this view, the charge of judicial activism has significant content and should be deployed to restrain renegade judges. The other side insists that calling someone a "judicial activist" has only emotive content and is used merely as an empty epithet denouncing judges with whom one disagrees. This Article redirects the controversy over judicial activism by distinguishing between two different, but interrelated, levels of constitutional discourse: the surface level and the deep level. The problem of judicial activism exists on the surface level of constitutional discourse and will remain irresolvable on that level. However, once we attend to the deep level of constitutional discourse, the role of judicial activism becomes clear. The presence of judicial activism on the surface structure of constitutional discourse reveals on the deep structure reasonable disagreement over the meaning of key constitutional provisions. The idea of "reasonable disagreement" is profitably explicated by combining what social theorist W.B. Gallie called "essentially contested concepts" with the political philosopher John Rawls' important categorization of "the burdens of judgment." These obstacles to rational consensus are endemic to a republican democracy. Consequently, reasonable disagreement over key constitutional provisions should not be regarded negatively; it is an inevitable and positive feature of any society championing liberty, equality, and pluralism. However, the inevitability and desirability of reasonable disagreement has institutional consequences for constitutional review. When reasonable disagreement is inevitable, legislatures, not courts should have the last word on constitutional meaning.

Recent critics of the Roberts Court chide it for its lack of regard for precedent. Fred Schauer faults these critics for erroneously assuming that a rule of stare decisis formerly played a significant role in the Supreme Court's decision-making. In fact, it has long played only a rare and weak role in the Court's work. Nonetheless, according to Schauer, the critics are to be thanked for invigorating a needed debate about the importance of "stability, consistency, settlement, reliance, notice, and predictability" in the Court's decisions. This article argues that Schauer exaggerates the weakness of stare decisis in the Court's practices; and that his call for a public debate on the merits of the norm of stare decisis can only weaken it.

The manner of conduct of Constitutional referendums in Ireland has come under particularly sharp focus since the defeat of the referendum which was intended to facilitate the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008. The Supreme Court rulings considered in this article - Crotty v. An Taoiseach, McKenna v. An Taoiseach (No. 2) and Coughlan v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission and RTÉ combined with the failure of successive executives and legislatures to react to them in an adequate manner with legislation have played a significant role in the failure of Ireland to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon by the time of writing. Indeed, if the decision not to ratify the Lisbon Treaty is not ultimately reversed, it may well be that these judgments will collectively come to be regarded as the most significant examples of judicial activism in Irish legal history. Somewhat curiously, notwithstanding the very major impact which Supreme Court jurisprudence has had on the frequency and conduct of referendums on European Treaties in Ireland, the case-law examined here has until recently attracted relatively little academic attention. This article seeks to redress this lacuna.

The is a case comment on the recent decision of the Indian Supreme Court with respect to Judicial review of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.

This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao’s study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court’s early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once in controversial cases regarding racial integration, capital punishment’s abolition and re-legality, and the 2000 Presidential election. Philosophers are peculiarly absent from major controversial cases. Rao claims the Court’s majority decisions avoided the “Philosophers’ Brief” because the philosophers’ argument was grounded in theory, not substantive legal argument surrounding issues of judicial precedent. This Comment challenges Rao’s use of “philosophy” as something entirely abstract and steeped in metaphysics. Philosophy is presented as a large umbrella covering diverse sub-fields, two of which are philosophy of law and political philosophy. These sub-fields are of great use to law. Thus, the Court has not illegitimately used philosophers to support personal policy preferences. Nor is the use of philosophy incommensurable with judicial decision-making.

While overshadowed by rulings concerning the rights of detainees, executive power and judicial review in the "war on terror," the Supreme Court recently issued three surprisingly significant decisions on international law. These cases show a realistic reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of international law's central importance to U.S. jurisprudence, the rejection of a post-war conservative belittlement as well as an apparent disdain for it, and a prudent determination of Congressional intent and judicial precedent in global commerce. While dealing with quite technical issues of the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction in alien torts, sovereign immunity and antitrust, these three decisions suggest a return to pragmatism by the Supreme Court. Taken together they provide a sensible balancing of foreign policy concerns within the context of the separation of powers and foreign relations. They also serve as a counterweight to the political degradation of international law that started with the Reagan-Bush era and continued through the current Bush administration.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007) was quickly hailed as the most important federalism ruling in 20 years. The decision has already been the subject of considerable academic commentary, but that academic commentary has been focussed, almost exclusively, on the doctrinal implications of the decision; there has been very little discussion of the underlying theory of federalism described in the decision. This paper will fill that gap. I will argue that, in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court clearly outlines the theory of judicial review that has been animating its decision-making in division of powers cases, at times explicitly, but mostly implicitly, for at least the last ten years. Under this theory, the Supreme Court encourages the political branches to take the lead in defining the scope of the division of powers; the Supreme Court limits itself to facilitating an intergovernmental dialogue about the scope of the division of powers, and managing the conflict that results where the political branches fail to reach agreement.

With the decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the United States Supreme Court overstepped the bounds of the government-to-government relationship between Tribal Nations and the United States. The Strate decision follows a recent trend in the Supreme Court's decisions or judicial activism in terms of federal Indian law, and also signals a return to former anti-Indian underpinnings in its decisions of the early 1900s. This article will examine: Part I, the legal background of the Strate v. A-1 Contractors decision; Part II, the Strate v. A-1 Contractors by the United States Supreme Court; Part III, the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations and the conflicts with the Strate decision; and Part IV, the pragmatic future impact of the Strate decision on the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.

Since former President Soeharto was forced to resign in 1998, the Indonesian judiciary has been significantly reformed. A Judicial Commission was established to monitor its performance. A Constitutional Court was also created; one of its tasks is to decide disputes between state institutions and to review the constitutionality of statutes. This paper discusses the Constitutional Court case in which several Supreme Court judges alleged that the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial independence precluded the Judicial Commission from supervising the Supreme Court’s performance by critically analysing its decisions. The Constitutional Court accepted this argument, declaring that the Indonesian Constitution prohibited the Judicial Commission from performing this function. This paper discusses this case and its potential ramifications.

Since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadians have played out an American-style debate about judicial activism at an accelerated pace. Throughout the 1980s, a number of commentators on the left expressed concerns that the Court was interpreting the Charter in a manner that would thwart legislative attempts to assist the disadvantaged and strike down progressive social legislation as occurred in the United States in the Lochner era: During the next decade, commentators on the right duplicated American criticisms of the Warren Court by arguing that the Supreme Court was exercising too much power by inventing rights not found in the Constitution, and by enforcing the rights of minorities and criminals against the wishes of the majority and their elected representatives. Despite their different politics, these critics of judicial activism share much. They all believe that judges can read their personal preferences into the Charter; they are all skeptical about the rights asserted in Charter litigation; and they all have faith in majoritarian forms of democracy and legislative supremacy.In this essay, I will argue that the term judicial activism is ultimately not a helpful way to structure debate about judicial review under the Charter or other modern bills of rights that allow rights as interpreted by the Court to be limited and overridden by ordinary legislation. The label judicial activism obscures more than it illuminates and allows commentators to criticize the Court and the Charter without really explaining their reasons for doing so. It hints at, if not judicial impropriety, at least judicial overreaching, while hiding often controversial assumptions made by the critics of judicial activism about judging, rights and democracy. Such assumptions need to be revealed and unpacked for all the world to see.