Ability-based objections to no-best-world arguments
Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
| Abstract | In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments . In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent’s possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesYoav Yigael (2004). A Proposal for the Creation of a Human and Computer Metalanguage. World Futures 60 (7):535 – 546.
Bruce Langtry (2008). God, the Best, and Evil. OUP Oxford.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Klaas J. Kraay (2005). William L. Rowe's a Priori Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 22:211-234.
Wesley Morriston (1982). Pike and Hoffman on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Philosophy Research Archives 8:521-529.
Nicholas Everitt (2000). Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough. Philosophical Papers 29 (3):155-158.
Bradley Monton (2011). Prolegomena to Any Future Physics-Based Metaphysics. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume III.
Rick Grush (2000). Self, World and Space: The Meaning and Mechanisms of Ego- and Allocentric Spatial Representation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):59-92.
Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
Germund Hesslow & D.-A. Jirenhed (2007). The Inner World of a Simple Robot. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):85-96.
Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic. Studia Logica 82 (3):329 - 336.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-03-15Total downloads20 ( #61,609 of 549,754 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
