Naturalism and the Problem of Evil

Philo 10 (2):125-135 (2007)
Abstract
The evidential argument from evil against theism requires a background of assumptions which, if correct, would appear to pose at least as great an evidential threat to naturalism as extensive pain and suffering pose to theism. In this paper, I argue that the conscious suffering and objective moral judgments required to construct evidential arguments from evil form the basis of powerful prima facie arguments against naturalism that are similar in force and structure to recent versions of the evidential argument from evil
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    James A. Keller (1989). The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3):155 - 171.
    Richard Otte (2000). Evidential Arguments From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
    Jeff Jordan (2006). Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):403 - 417.
    James R. Beebe, Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Daniel Howard-Snyder (1990). Surplus Evil. Philosophical Quarterly 40:78-86.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-01-09

    Total downloads

    11 ( #112,960 of 1,088,753 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,750 of 1,088,753 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.