David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24 (2011)
Objectivists and perspectivists disagree about the question of whether what an agent ought to do depends on the totality of facts or on the agent’s limited epistemic perspective. While objectivism fails to account for normative guidance, perspectivism faces the challenge of explaining phenomena (occurring most notably in advice, but also in first-personal deliberation) in which the use of “ought” is geared to evidence that is better than the evidence currently available to the agent. This paper aims to defend perspectivism by developing a perspectivist account that captures the phenomena in question.
|Keywords||ought deliberation advice normativity objective vs. subjective ought|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
Susanne Mantel (2013). Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (2015). Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle. Ethics 125 (4):921-946.
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