'Ought' and the Perspective of the Agent
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24 (2011)
| Abstract | Objectivists and perspectivists disagree about the question of whether what an agent ought to do depends on the totality of facts or on the agent’s limited epistemic perspective. While objectivism fails to account for normative guidance, perspectivism faces the challenge of explaining phenomena (occurring most notably in advice, but also in first-personal deliberation) in which the use of “ought” is geared to evidence that is better than the evidence currently available to the agent. This paper aims to defend perspectivism by developing a perspectivist account that captures the phenomena in question. | |||||||||
| Keywords | ought deliberation advice normativity objective vs. subjective ought | |||||||||
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