Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497 (2007)
In this paper, we show that presentism?the view that the way things are is the way things presently are?is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701572279
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References found in this work BETA
C. D. Broad (1923). Scientific Thought. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Simon Keller (2004). 1. A Problem for Presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:83.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2015). Nefarious Presentism. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
Sam Baron (2014). The Priority of the Now. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:0-0.

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