Quantifiers in ontology

Studia Logica 36 (4):301-307 (1977)
This paper is a reaction to G. Küng's and J. T. Canty's Substitutional Quantification and Leniewskian quantifiers'Theoria 36 (1970), 165–182. I reject their arguments that quantifiers in Ontology cannot be referentially interpreted but I grant that there is what can be called objectual — referential interpretation of quantifiers and that because of the unrestricted quantification in Ontology the quantifiers in Ontology should not be given a so-called objectual-referential interpretation. I explain why I am in agreement with Küng and Canty's recommendation that Ontology's quantifiers not be substitutionally interpreted even if Leniewski intended them to be so interpreted. A notion of an interpretation which is referential but yet which does not interpret as an assertor of existence of objects in a domain is developed. It is then shown that a first order version of Ontology is satisfied by those special kind of referential interpretations which read as Something as epposed to Something existing.
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DOI 10.2307/20014867
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References found in this work BETA
Karel Lambert (1972). Derivation and Counterexample. Encino, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
Charles F. Kielkopf (1973). Recent Trends in Logic. New Scholasticism 47 (3):381-405.

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