Autonomy and false beliefs

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531 (2013)
Abstract
The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy
Keywords Autonomy  False beliefs  Action  Mele  McKenna
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,747
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
John Christman (1991). Autonomy and Personal History. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1 - 24.

View all 21 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
François Schroeter (2004). Endorsement and Autonomous Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633 - 659.
James Rocha (2011). Autonomy Within Subservient Careers. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):313-328.
Mark Leon (2000). Believing Autonomously. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-08

Total downloads

52 ( #30,157 of 1,098,832 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #26,870 of 1,098,832 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.