Ethics 93 (3):451-466 (1983)
|Abstract||A line of thought suggested by certain passages in Mill's writings runs as follows. [Note 1] Virtue should be regarded as an end in itself outranking even happiness, because virtue so regarded guarantees certain modes of feeling and conduct, and the benefits resulting from this guarantee make up for what is lost in the odd cases in which virtue and happiness conflict. Notice that benefits result from the guarantee, not only from the conduct guaranteed. In this paper I will explore this theory in comparison with certain other versions of utilitarianism. I will illustrate my argument by reference to Mill, who, I believe, held substantially this theory; but exegesis is not my present purpose.|
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