Causation, nomic subsumption, and the concept of event

Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236 (1973)
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Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2025096
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Stuart Glennan (2010). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):362-381.

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