David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):890-891 (2001)
We agree with the authors that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is needed. However, we believe that the answer will not be found in a common representational structure encoding distal events, as the authors propose, but in Gibson's notion of ecological information, which, as we demonstrate, specifies not only perspective but also prospective and retrospective states of affairs.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dan Lloyd (1987). Mental Representation From the Bottom Up. Synthese 70 (January):23-78.
Endre E. Kadar & Judith A. Effken (2005). From Discrete Actors to Goal-Directed Actions: Toward a Process-Based Methodology for Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):353 – 382.
Nam-Gyoon Kim (2001). The Role of Eye Movements in Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):988-990.
Cees van Leeuwen & John Stins (1994). Perceivable Information Or: The Happy Marriage Between Ecological Psychology and Gestalt. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):267-285.
Paul J. Treffner (1999). The Common Structure is the Affordance in the Ecology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):731-732.
Arie Rip (2009). Technology as Prospective Ontology. Synthese 168 (3):405 - 422.
J. Christopher Maloney (1994). Content: Covariation, Control, and Contingency. Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
Joel Feinberg (1988). Responsibility for the Future. Philosophy Research Archives 14:93-113.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #501,615 of 1,696,646 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?