Synthese 122 (3):245-259 (2000)
|Abstract||It is often argued that if a mentalproperty supervenes on a physical property, then (1)the mental property M ``inherits'''' its causal efficacyfrom the physical property P and (2) the causalefficacy of M reduces to that of P. However, once weunderstand the supervenience thesis and the concept ofcausation probabilistically, it turns out that we caninfer the causal efficacy of M from that of P andvice versa if and only if a certain condition, whichI call the ``line-up'''' thesis, holds. I argue that thesupervenience thesis entails neither this conditionnor its denial. I also argue that even when theline-up thesis holds true, reductionism about thecausal efficacy of the mental property doesn''tfollow|
|Keywords||Causation Metaphysics Mind Probability Supervenience|
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