The myth of non-reductive materialism

Abstract
Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive
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Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.

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