Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610 (2002)
|Abstract||Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for or against multiple realizability.|
|Keywords||Brain Multiple Neuroscience Realizability Science Bechtel, W Mundale, J|
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