Testing multiple realizability: A discussion of Bechtel and Mundale

Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610 (2002)
Abstract
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for or against multiple realizability.
Keywords Brain  Multiple  Neuroscience  Realizability  Science  Bechtel, W  Mundale, J
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Sungsu Kim (2011). Multiple Realization and Evidence. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
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