Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker's physical realization

Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112 (2010)
Abstract
This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization . Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
Keywords Realization  Multiple realization  Property  Causal profile  Causal power  Mental causation  Subset view  Second-order view  Physicalism  Type physicalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,412
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

View all 14 references

Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Morris (2010). Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-01-27

Total downloads

190 ( #3,223 of 1,103,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #11,162 of 1,103,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.