Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker's physical realization

Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112 (2010)
This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization . Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
Keywords Realization  Multiple realization  Property  Causal profile  Causal power  Mental causation  Subset view  Second-order view  Physicalism  Type physicalism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Kevin Morris (2010). Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
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