David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 62 (1):29 - 46 (2005)
In this paper, I will argue that Radfords real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Waltons account, which treats Radfords puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radfords puzzle per se, but that he has not recognized the importance of this puzzle. While doing this, I will suggest a revision to the cognitive theory of emotion.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
Patricia Greenspan (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
Kendall L. Walton (1978). Fearing Fictions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):5-27.
John Deigh (1994). Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.
Peter Lamarque (1981). How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions? British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (4):291-304.
Citations of this work BETA
K. I. M. Seahwa (2010). The Rationality of Emotion Toward Fiction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):106-119.
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