Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):201 – 218 (2004)
|Abstract||Debates about explanation in the social sciences often proceed without any clear idea what an 'account' of explanation should do. In this paper I take a stance - what I will call contextualism - that denies there are purely formal and conceptual constraints on explanation and takes standards of explanation to be substantive empirical claims, paradigmatically claims about causation. I then use this standpoint to argue for position on issues in the philosophy of social science concerning reduction, idealized models, social mechanisms, functional explanations, inference to the best explanation and interpretive understanding.|
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