How to believe in qualia

In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 285--298 (2008)
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in The Case for Qualia,ed. by Edmond Wright , MIT Press (2008), pp. 285-298.
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Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
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