Jean Buridan's philosophy of science

Abstract
introduced the concept of effective demand in the nascent science of economics; his discussions of astronomy were acute enough to raise Duhem’s interest. Neither are Buridan’s credentials as a nominalist in doubt, although investigation into his precise relation to William of Ockham continues: he rejected all abstract entities, whether universals, common natures, the complexe significabile, or types above and beyond tokens; for Buridan, every thing which exists is a concrete individual. His anti-realism included an epistemological component as well, for Buridan maintained that the source of all knowledge is experience.
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    References found in this work BETA
    T. Kermit Scott (1971). Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1):15-41.
    Eileen Serene (1982). Demonstrative Science. In Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny & Jan Pinborg (eds.), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge. 496--517.
    Paul Vincent Spade (1982). The Semantics of Terms. In Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny & Jan Pinborg (eds.), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge.
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