On fineness of grain

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781 (2013)
A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided. It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems
Keywords Propositions  Propositional attitudes  Possible worlds  Structured propositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9844-9
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel 79-100.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Collins (2014). Cutting It (Too) Fine. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):143-172.

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