On invariant-sensitive graspers and cue-sensitive perceivers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):110-110 (2001)
| Abstract | I argue that Norman's thesis works in sofaras one is prepared to be lax about the alleged congruency between “ecological” and “dorsal,” and unconcerned by the results of recent studies showing that grasping movements are subject to the same geometric distortion illusions as perceptual judgements. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesBradford Skow (2012). A Solution to the Problem of Indeterminate Desert. Mind 121 (481):37-65.
Scott Stapleford (2009). Locke on Sensitive Knowledge as Knowledge. Theoria 75 (3):206-231.
Stewart Cohen (2005). Knowledge, Speaker and Subject. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212.
Jonathan Schaffer (2012). Causal Contextualisms. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
Tim Black (2008). Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism. In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
Carl Knight (2011). Responsibility, Desert, and Justice. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
Martijn Blaauw (2008). Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
Jonathan Schaffer (2006). The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
