David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 53 (4):492-513 (1986)
This paper contributes to the recently renewed debate over methodological individualism (MI) by carefully sorting out various individualist claims and by making use of recent work on reduction and explanation outside the social sciences. My major focus is on individualist claims about reduction and explanation. I argue that reductionist versions of MI fail for much the same reasons that mental predicates cannot be reduced to physical predicates and that attempts to establish reducibility by weakening the requirements for reduction also fail. I consider and reject a number of explanatory theses, among them the claims that any adequate theory must refer only to individuals and that individualist theory suffices to explain fully. The latter claim, I argue, is not entailed by the supervenience of social facts on individual facts. Lastly, I argue that there is one individualist restriction on explanation which is far more plausible and significant than one would initially suspect
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Frank Hindriks (2013). The Location Problem in Social Ontology. Synthese 190 (3):413-437.
Harold Kincaid (1988). Supervenience and Explanation. Synthese 77 (November):251-81.
Bryce Huebner, Janette Dinishak, James A. Marcum & Jelle De Schrijver (2008). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):843 – 858.
Julius Sensat (1988). Methodological Individualism and Marxism. Economics and Philosophy 4 (02):189-.
J. Brakel (1996). Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image. Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
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