David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48 (2003)
I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.
|Keywords||Epistemology Introspection Perception Self-knowledge Moore Shoemaker, S|
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References found in this work BETA
Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
Citations of this work BETA
R. E. Y. Georges (2013). We Are Not All 'Self‐Blind': A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism. Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.
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