David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):327-349 (2011)
This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhn's work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress.
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas S. Kuhn (1996/2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Immanuel Kant (1998). Critique of Pure Reason (Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood). Cambridge.
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Richard Rorty (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Kuhn (ed.) (2000). The Road Since Structure. University of Chicago Press.
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