David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2007)
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes <span class='Hi'>structure</span> on them? And if the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy is distinct from the proposition that Tracy loves Glenn yet both have the same constituents, what is about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? In The <span class='Hi'>Nature</span> and <span class='Hi'>Structure</span> of Content, Jeffrey C. <span class='Hi'>King</span> formulates a detailed account of the metaphysical <span class='Hi'>nature</span> of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes <span class='Hi'>structure</span> on them, <span class='Hi'>King</span> deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: he shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on his approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The <span class='Hi'>Nature</span> and <span class='Hi'>Structure</span> of Content also contains a detailed account of the <span class='Hi'>nature</span> of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis. Scholars and students working in the philosophy of mind and language will find this book rewarding reading.
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|Call number||BC181.K56 2007|
|ISBN(s)||0199226067 9780199226061 9780199566266|
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Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2016). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):307-328.
Jonathan Schaffer (2012). Necessitarian Propositions. Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
James Pryor (forthcoming). Mental Graphs. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-33.
Christopher Gregory Weaver (forthcoming). Yet Another New Cosmological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-21.
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