Time travel and self-consistency: Implications for determinism and the human condition
Ratio 12 (3):271–278 (1999)
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John Earman (1967). On Going Backward in Time. Philosophy of Science 34 (3):211-222.
Douglas Kutach (2013). Time Travel and Time Machines. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Blackwell.
Steven D. Hales (2010). No Time Travel for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
William Grey (1999). Troubles with Time Travel. Philosophy 74 (1):55-70.
Nick Smith (2005). Why Would Time Travelers Try to Kill Their Younger Selves? The Monist 88 (3):388-395.
Douglas N. Kutach (2003). Time Travel and Consistency Constraints. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1098-1113.
Douglas Kutach (2003). Time Travel and Consistency Constraints. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1098-1113.
Kurt Stocker (2012). The Time Machine in Our Mind. Cognitive Science 36 (3):385-420.
Phil Dowe (2000). The Case for Time Travel. Philosophy 75 (3):441-451.
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