David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244 (2003)
Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. Although there is a sense in which experience can be said to be transparent, transparency in this sense does not give us any particular motivation for representationalism—or at least, not the pure or strong representationalism that it is usually invoked to support
|Keywords||transparency representationalism qualia|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum 209-235.
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Berit Brogaard (2015). Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson (forthcoming). Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
William E. Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism About Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 261-276.
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