What's so transparent about transparency?

Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244 (2003)
Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. Although there is a sense in which experience can be said to be transparent, transparency in this sense does not give us any particular motivation for representationalism—or at least, not the pure or strong representationalism that it is usually invoked to support
Keywords transparency  representationalism  qualia
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DOI 10.1023/A:1025124607332
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Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.

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