Synthese 108 (2):157-70 (1996)
|Abstract||Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false|
|Keywords||Anomalous Metaphysics Mind Monism Physicalism Reductionism Supervenience Kim, J|
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