How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Synthese 108 (2):157-70 (1996)
  Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false
Keywords Anomalous  Metaphysics  Mind  Monism  Physicalism  Reductionism  Supervenience  Kim, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413495
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.

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Steven Horst (2005). Phenomenology and Psychophysics. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):1-21.
Andrew Melnyk (1998). The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.

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