How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Synthese 108 (2):157-70 (1996)
Abstract
  Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false
Keywords Anomalous  Metaphysics  Mind  Monism  Physicalism  Reductionism  Supervenience  Kim, J
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Melnyk (1998). The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.
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Robert Kirk (2001). Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 19--26.
Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Marian David (1997). Kim's Functionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):133-48.
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