Tarski's physicalism

Erkenntnis 38 (3):289-302 (1993)
  Hartry Field has argued that Alfred Tarski desired to reduce all semantic concepts to concepts acceptable to physicalism and that Tarski failed to do this. In the two succeeding decades, Field has been charged with being too lenient with Tarski; but it has been almost universally accepted that an objection at least as strong as Field's is telling against Tarski's theory. Close examination of the relevant literature, most of it printed in this journal in the 1930s, reveals that Field's conception of physicalism is anachronistic. Tarski did succeed in furthering the sort of physicalist program he had in mind
Keywords Language  Physicalism  Semantics  Tarski
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128232
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References found in this work BETA
Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.
Rudolf Carnap (1934). The Unity of Science. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd..

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