David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 46 (4):613-622 (1979)
The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural kind status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael T. Ghiselin (1981). Categories, Life, and Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):269.
Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace (1981). Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9 (3):237-304.
Michael Devitt (2008). Resurrecting Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):344-382.
Arthur L. Caplan (1981). Pick Your Poison: Historicism, Essentialism, and Emergentism in the Definition of Species. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):285.
Joel Cracraft (1987). Species Concepts and the Ontology of Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):329-346.
Similar books and articles
Crawford L. Elder (2008). Biological Species Are Natural Kinds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):339-362.
Martin Mahner (1993). What Is a Species? A Contribution to the Never Ending Species Debate in Biology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (1):103 - 126.
Joseph LaPorte (2003). Does a Type Specimen Necessarily or Contingently Belong to its Species? Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):583-588.
Keith A. Coleman & E. O. Wiley (2001). On Species Individualism: A New Defense of the Species-as-Individuals Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 68 (4):498-517.
Laurance J. Splitter (1988). Species and Identity. Philosophy of Science 55 (3):323-348.
Arthur C. Caplan (1980). Have Species Become Declasse? Psa 1980:71-82.
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Michael Ruse (1987). Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):225-242.
A. Aaron Snyder (1982). Taxonomy and Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:512 - 521.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #93,274 of 1,906,946 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #345,620 of 1,906,946 )
How can I increase my downloads?