David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97 (1985)
Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in computational psychology by dismissing some putative tasks as impossible. Block argues that the widespread faith in functionalism is just not warranted. I argue that all these critiques are misguided because they depend on holding cognitive psychology to taxonomic standards that other sciences routinely rise above
|Keywords||Computational Complexity Mental States Psychology Science Taxonomy Block, N|
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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computation Without Representation. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). A Farewell to Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.
Todd Jones (1991). Staving Off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.
Gary Hatfield (1988). Representation and Content in Some (Actual) Theories of Perception. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (2):175-214.
G. Scott Davis (2008). Two Neglected Classics of Comparative Ethics. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (3):375-403.
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