Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):33-63 (2000)
|Abstract||Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison's attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell's linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique's analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic normativity that is importantly different from McDowell's own account in terms of a `second nature' created through `Bildung'. Finally, I argue that Kant's epistemic analyses also lead to a model of the cognitive self that answers two contemporary questions: why should we refer to selves at all? in what dies the unity of a subject of thought consist?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
A. C. Grayling (1988/2001). Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Michael Kremer (2000). Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584.
Patricia Kitcher (2011). Kant's Thinker. Oxford University Press.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2006). Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
Paul Livingston (2007). Wittgenstein, Kant and the Critique of Totality. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (6):691-715.
Clinton Tolley (2012). Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).
Kurt Mosser (2009). Kant and Wittgenstein: Common Sense, Therapy, and the Critical Philosophy. Philosophia 37 (1):1-20.
Christopher Norris (2011). ‘Second Nature’, Knowledge, and Normativity: Revisiting McDowell’s Kant. Diametros 27:64-107.
Brandon C. Look (2011). Kant's Thinker. Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (4):502-503.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #48,060 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?